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Political Analysis Advance Access first published online on June 8, 2005
This version published online on November 23, 2005
Political Analysis, doi:10.1093/pan/mpi017
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Article

Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling

Jonathan Wand 1 *

1 Department of Political Science, Encina Hall West, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Jonathan Wand, E-mail: wand{at}stanford.edu


  Abstract

Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensive form games crucially depends on assumptions about the distribution of player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptions for differentiating standard statistical models of strategic choice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz (2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium models are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics as claimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions about the distribution of player types. The method of analysis developed and the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structural models of conflict and bargaining.

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