Political Analysis Advance Access originally published online on March 13, 2006
Political Analysis 2006 14(4):369-392; doi:10.1093/pan/mpj008
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Equilibria and Restoring Forces in Models of Vote Dynamics
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, New York 13902-6000
e-mail: mdmcd{at}binghamton.edu (corresponding author)
e-mail: rbest1{at}gmail.com
Theories of voting tell us that party vote dynamics have two core components, long-run equilibria and more or less rapid returns to equilibria after short-run deviations. Statistical models used to represent these theories, however, tend to emphasize one component or the other. The unbalanced emphasis leaves the theoretical ideas underspecified and produces biased estimates of both long- and short-run components of vote dynamics. We specify the two components in the familiar form of an error correction model and demonstrate its advantages in terms of its theoretical consistency, simplicity, and precise prediction of whether something is wrong. We illustrate its usefulness by applying it to two sets of analyses reported in the literature and showing that it usually changes the conclusions reported in regard to both the equilibrium levels of party competition and the strength of restoring forces.