Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrowScopus Links
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Lewis, J. B.
Right arrow Articles by Schultz, K. A.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Political Analysis, 11:4
© 2003 by the Society for Political Methodology

Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information

Jeffrey B. Lewis and Kenneth A. Schultz

Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095 e-mail: jblewis{at}ucla.edu e-mail: kschultz{at}polisci.ucla.edu

We develop an empirical estimator directly from an extensive-form crisis bargaining game with incomplete information and discuss its features and limitations. The estimator makes it possible to draw inferences about states' payoffs from observational data on crisis outcomes while remaining faithful to the theorized strategic and informational structure. We compare this estimator to one based on a symmetric information version of the same game, using the quantal response equilibrium proposed in this context by Signorino (1999, American Political Science Review 93:279–298). We then address issues of identification that arise in trying to learn about actors' utilities by observing their play of a strategic game. In general, a number of identifying restrictions are needed in order to pin down the distribution of payoffs and the effects of covariates on those payoffs.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
J. Esarey, B. Mukherjee, and W. H. Moore
Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games
Political Analysis, July 1, 2008; 16(3): 250 - 273.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
D. M. Gibler
The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation
Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1, 2008; 52(3): 426 - 454.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
M. A. Bas, C. S. Signorino, and R. W. Walker
Statistical Backwards Induction: A Simple Method for Estimating Recursive Strategic Models
Political Analysis, January 1, 2008; 16(1): 21 - 40.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
C. S. Signorino
On Formal Theory and Statistical Methods: A Response to Carrubba, Yuen, and Zorn
Political Analysis, October 15, 2007; (2007) mpm027v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
C. J. Carrubba, A. Yuen, and C. Zorn
In Defense of Comparative Statics: Specifying Empirical Tests of Models of Strategic Interaction
Political Analysis, October 1, 2007; 15(4): 465 - 482.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
K. A. Schultz and J. B. Lewis
Learning about Learning: A Response to Wand
Political Analysis, January 1, 2006; 14(1): 121 - 129.
[Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 POLIT ANALHome page
J. Wand
Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling
Political Analysis, January 1, 2006; 14(1): 101 - 120.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Journal of Conflict ResolutionHome page
A. Smith and A. C. Stam
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Journal of Conflict Resolution, December 1, 2004; 48(6): 783 - 813.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.